Recent Developments: Hudson v. United States: Imposition of Civil and Criminal Penalties Not an Automatic Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause by Tate, Amy B.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 28
Number 2 Summer 1998 Article 9
1998
Recent Developments: Hudson v. United States:
Imposition of Civil and Criminal Penalties Not an
Automatic Violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause
Amy B. Tate
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tate, Amy B. (1998) "Recent Developments: Hudson v. United States: Imposition of Civil and Criminal Penalties Not an Automatic
Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 28 : No. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol28/iss2/9
Recent Developments 
Hudson v. United States: 
In Hudson v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997), the 
United States Supreme Court 
held that civil penalties, including 
monetary fines and debarment 
from a profeSSion, do not 
constitute punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes. In so 
holding, the Court abrogated its 
previous holding in United States 
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), 
in which civil fines of a certain 
amount were considered 
punishment enough to invoke a 
finding of double jeopardy upon 
prosecution. 
Petitioners John Hudson, 
Jack Rackley, and Larry Barasel 
were contrOlling shareholders of 
two Oklahoma Banks during the 
1980's. An examination of the 
bank by the Officer of the 
Comptroller of Currency ("OCC") 
revealed violations of several 
banking statutes. The specific 
violations pertained to third party 
loans designed to aid Hudson in 
a buyback of bank stock used as 
collateral on defaulted loans. 
The petitioners were served with 
a "Notice of Assessment of 
Money Damages" for violation of 
12 U.S.C. §§ 84(a)(1) and 
375(b) (1982) and 12 C.F.R. §§ 
31.2(b) and 215.4(b) (1986). A 
fine of $100,000 was levied 
against Hudson while Rackley 
and Barasel were fined $50,000 
each. Subsequently, the OCC 
served each of the Petitioners 
with a "Notice of Intention to 
Base Further Participation," 
effectively barring them from 
working in any banking institution 
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in the future. The OCC 
proceedings against the 
Petitioners were resolved with a 
Stipulation and Consent Order 
which reduced the assessments 
levied and barred the Petitioners 
against participation in their 
profession. 
Two years later, the 
Petitioners were indicted in the 
United States District Court for 
the Western District of Oklahoma 
on charges of conspiracy, 
misapplication of bank funds and 
making false bank entries. The 
indictments focused on the same 
transactions for which the 
Petitioners were administratively 
sanctioned. They then moved to 
dismiss the charges as a 
violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. The motion was denied 
by the district court. On appeal, 
the court of appeals upheld the 
ruling on the non-participation 
sanction, but vacated the denial 
on the monetary fine issue and 
remanded to the district court. 
The district court dismissed the 
indictments, which the 
govemment appealed. The 
court of appeals reversed, 
applying the test of United States 
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), 
in which fines were considered 
"punishment" for double 
jeopardy purposes when "grossly 
disproportionate" to the 
damages inflicted on the 
government. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to resolve the double jeopardy 
implications of Halper. The 
Court affirmed the finding of the 
court of appeals but refused to 
apply Halper. 
The Court began its analysis 
by reiterating that the bar against 
double jeopardy prevents an 
imposition of multiple criminal 
punishments for the same 
offense. Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 
493 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 
303 U.S. 391 (1938)). In 
determining whether a 
punishment will invoke a double 
jeopardy violation, a court must 
discern if a particular punishment 
is classified as civil or criminal. 
This will be "indicated either 
expressly or impliedly" in the 
statute. Id. (quoting United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
248 (1980)). The Court noted 
that even in such cases where 
the legislature's intent was to 
impose a civil fine, the statutory 
scheme must be examined to 
determine if the punishment was 
so severe as to "transform ... a 
civil remedy into a criminal 
punishment." Id. (quoting Rex 
Trailer Co. v. U.S., 350 U.S. 148, 
154 (1956)). 
The Court cited several 
factors from Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Marlinez, 372 U.S. 144 
(1963) that should be used to 
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determine if a punishment is civil 
or criminal. The factors include: 
whether the sanction involves 
"affirmative disability or restraint; 
whether the sanction has been 
historically regarded as 
punishment; whether it comes 
into play only after a finding of 
scienter; whether it fits the 
traditional aims of punishment-
retribution and deterrence; and 
whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned." Id. (quoting 
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69). 
The Court then reinforced that 
the factors could only be applied 
to the "statute on its face" and 
that only the "clearest proof' 
permitted overriding legislative 
intent. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 
U.S. at 249). Halper, the Court 
opined, was decided without 
applying the factors and, thus, 
was an "ill-considered" deviation 
from the traditional double 
jeopardy analysis applied by the 
Court. Id. at 494. 
The traditional analysis, as 
exemplified in Ward, to 
determine a bar based on 
double jeopardy purposes 
involves a two-step test. Id. The 
court must first determine 
whether the punishment is civil 
or criminal, then whether the 
successive punishment is 
criminal. Id. The Court found 
error in the Halper Court's 
concentration on the Kennedy 
factor of excessiveness of 
punishment in relation to 
damages inflicted and a failure to 
consider the sanctions in relation 
to the statute. Id. The result of 
the error, according to the Court, 
28.2 U. Bait. L.F.J. 28 
was the creation of an 
unworkable standard to 
determine whether a sanction is 
punitive. Id. The Halper 
standard proved especially 
unworkable in cases such as the 
case sub judice where criminal 
proceedings followed civil 
penalties. Id. The Court 
reasoned that under Halper, "it 
would not be possible to 
determine whether the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is violated until 
a defendant has proceeded 
through a trial to judgment." Id. 
at 495. The Court further 
reinforced the need to abandon 
Halper by noting other 
constitutional provisions protect 
individuals from penalties such 
as irrational sanctions and 
excessive civil fines. Id. 
Turning to case at hand, the 
Court found that the fines and 
debarment sanctions do not 
violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause when using the traditional 
analysis. Id. The Court cited 
clear congreSSional intent to 
make the acc penalties civil 
punishment. Id. First, the money 
penalties are expressly classified 
in 12 U.S.C. sections 93(b)(1) 
and 504(a) as civil. Id. (citing 12 
U.S.C. §§ 93(b)(1), 504(a) 
(1982». Second, while not 
expressly stated as a civil 
sanctions, the Court found the 
referral of debarment 
proceedings to the "appropriate 
Federal banking agencies" to be 
prima facie evidence that 
Congress intended debarment to 
be a civil sanction. Id. 
Applying the second step of 
the Ward test, the Court found 
that the sanctions could not 
provide the "clearest proof' that 
Congress intended the sanctions 
to be criminal in nature. Id. The 
penalties were not traditionally 
viewed as punishment and 
debarment is viewed as a 
revocation of voluntarily granted 
privilege, which is "free of the 
punitive criminal element." Id. at 
496 (quoting Helvering v. 
Mitchell at 399). The Court 
further found that the instant 
case further failed upon 
application of the Kennedy 
factors, most notably the 
traditional goal of criminal 
punishment as a deterrent. Id. 
In previous holdings by the 
Court, deterrence "serve[d] civil 
as well as criminal goals." Id. 
(quoting United States v. Usery, 
116 S.Ct. 2135, 2149 (1996». 
The holding in Hudson v. 
United States was a necessary 
return to the traditional double 
jeopardy test applied in Ward. 
The potential elimination of 
criminal accountability based on 
substantial civil penalties under 
Halper produced many poor 
results. The availability of a civil 
deterrent is an important feature 
in the regulatory scheme of 
many agencies. Holding 
violators civilly and criminally 
accountable for their actions 
serves the greater good by 
protecting industries as well as 
individuals affected by the 
criminal actions of defendants 
such as those in Hudson. 
